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A NOTE ON THE NEW
MINIMUM WAGE RESEARCH
ABSTRACT
Using panel data on individual from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, we find
that employed individuals who were affected by the increases in the federal minimum wage in
1979 and 1980 were 3 to 4% less likely Lo be employed a year later, even after accounting for
the fact that workers employed at the minimum wage may differ from their peers in unnbserved
ways. These results were obtained using a methodology similar in spirit to Card's recent work
on the topic, although we use individual rather than state-level data, and an earlier time period.
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(617) 868-3900 Los Angeles, CA 90024
(310) 825-1011The Industrial and Labor Relations Review recently published
a volume showcaeing the "new minimum wage research" which
challenges the conventional wisdos regarding the effects of the
minimum wage. Time series evidence from the 1970s and early 19805
indicated that a 10% increase in the minimus wage would be
associated with a decrease in teenage employment of 1 to J% (Brown,
1988). Because of the inherent difficulties of drawing inferences
from time—series data, much of the nev research is based on cross—
sections of firms (Katz and Krueger, 1992) or individuals (Card
19925, 199Th). For example, Card (1992a) exploits the fact that
because of -regional variation in the wage distributions of
teenagers, largely due to variation in state minimum wages,
teenagers in different parts of the country had different
probabilities of being affected by the increases in the federal
minimum which took effect in 1990. He finds that the increase in
the federal minimum had no effect on teenage employment.
The volume also presents one paper which exploits state-level
panel data. The findings of Neumark and Wascher (1992) are at odds
with the rest of the new research in that they find a significant
negative effect of increases in the minimum on teenage employment
which is similar in size to that found in earlier studies. They
suggest that the discrepancy between their results and Card's for
example, could be due to the fact that Card's methodology does not
allow for lagged minimum wage effects. An alternative possibility
suggested by Ehrenberg in his introduction to the volume is that
the difference in results is an artifact of the fact that Neumsrk
1and Wascher'a data span an earlier time period than the other
papers: The changes in state minisuss which they examine occurred
between 1973 and 1989.
Still another possibility is that the reliance on state—level
variation in minimum wages confounds the effects of changes in the
minimum wage with coincident econoaic developments which vary in
intensity or timing from state to state. For example, Taylor and
Kim (1993) use induatry and county level data to re—examine the
effects of the 1988 increase in California's minimum studied by
Card (1992b) and find that "the textbook analysis pertains".
Our contribution to the minimum wage debate is to take the
level of disaggregation one step further: We use individual—level
panel data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY).
Like Neumark and Wascher, the minimum wage changes we examine span
an earlier time period than the Card papers: the increase from
$2.90 per hour to $3.10 per hour in January 1980, and from $3.10 to
$3.35 one year later. But in an experiment analogous to Card's, we
ask whether employed individuals likely to be affected by increases
in the federal minimum in these years were less likely than similar
individuals to be employed when they were interviewed a year later.
We also examine the effects of the minimum on individual year-to—
year wage changes. We use the panel aspect of the data to control
for possible unobserved differences between the affected workers
and other workers, in particular, for the possibility that low-wage
workers may also be high—turnover workers for unobserved reasons.
We find that affected workers were 3 to 4% less likely to beemployed a year later, even after accounting for unobserved
heterogeneity using fixed—effects estimators.We do not rind
eoneistent evidence of a positive effect of increases in the
minimum on the wages of workers who remained employed a year later.
Employmentappearsto be measured with less error then wages in our
data, so the ambiguous findings regarding wages could be due to
measurement error, since errors in the data could obscure the
correlation between changes in the minimum and changes in wages.
Due to data limitations, we cannot say whether differences in the
findings of the old and new studies are entirely a function of
differences in methodology, or, at least in part, a reflection of
real changes in the effects of the minimum wage over time.
Data
The NLSI began in 1979 with 12,686 young people between the
ages of 14 and 21. They have been reeurveyed every year since.
virtually all respondents were surveyed between February and May of
the survey year. At each interview, they are asked whether they
are currently employed, and their wage on the current job'. using
this information, we can determine whether they were in a job which
was affected by the increase in the federal minimum from $2.90 to
$3.10 which took affect on January 1980, or by the increase from
$3.10 to $3.35 which took affect one year later.
The next year in vhich the federal minimum wage increased was
1990. The first year in which a significant number of people in
3our sample would have been affected by state minimums higher than
the federal minimum is 1988.Unfortunately1 even the youngest
people in the NLSY were well out of their teens by this time, which
prevents us from examining Card's time period. We do use
information for the years after 1981, but only in order to control
for individual heterogeneity.Hence, we exclude data collected
after 1987 from the sample.
Table 1 describes the extract of data that we work with. The
first column showa statistics for all of the cross sections pooled
together over the 1979 to 1987 interval. There are 62397
observations with wage data. These pooled observations represent
11607 individuals.
The next two columns show statistics separately for people who
had a wage observation in 1979 or 1980. These workers had the
potential to be affected by changes in the minimum.The last
column describes those that had a wage observation in 1987 for
reference purposes.
The first row of the table shows that of the 12,686 people
included in the survey, only 30% had valid wage data in 1979. This
percentage rose over time: In 1980 it was 46% and by 1987 it had
risen to 68%.2 In what follows we do not attempt to take eccount
of selection into the labor market. We focus only on the effect of
chengem in the minimum on those who were already employed.
The next row shows that a small fraction of those who were
employed in whet we will call the "bsee" year, were missing
employment data a year later. On the basis of an examination of
4the data, we suspect that the majority of these people were not
employed. However, a comparison of the third and fourth rows shows
that the percent employed a year later is sisilar whether we delete
persons with missing data fros the sample, or assuse that those
with missing data were in fact not employed.
We next show the changes in the minimum between 1979 and 1980
and between 1980 and 1981, as well as the percentage of our
respondents who were "bound" by these changes. We consider a
person to have been bound by the change if they were working at a
wage less than the new minimum but no less than the old minimum in
the base year andif they were not working in the state or local
public sectors, in agriculture, or in domestic service. Thus,
individuals working in uncovered sectors as well as individuals
whose wagem were already too high to be directly affected by the
increase in the minimum wage serve as a comparison group which
controls for changes in the labor market which may have coincided
with the increases in the minimum wage. The uncovered workers also
act, to some extent, as a control for possible influences of low
wages themselves.
Observations with reported hourly wages of less than $1 or
greater than $50 were excluded from the sample, as most of these
reports appeared to reflect measurement error. By our measure, 20%
of the sample were bound by the 1980 increase, and 25% of the
sample were bound by the 1981 increase.
Among those who were bound, the average difference between
their old hourly wage and the new minimum was $0.15 in 1979 and
S$0.18 in 1980. This "wage gap" represents about 4% of the average
base wage in each year.The wage gap is seant to measure the
extent to which the increase in the minimum affects a worker, and
is set to zero for those who were not bound by the new minimum.
The gap, which by construction cannot exceed $0.25, may seem small
when one considers the fact that most people in this young sample
had wages which were growing rapidly from year to year: The
average percentage wage increase was 30% between 1979 and 1980 and
27% between 1980 and 1981.
However,Smith and Vavrichek's (1992) contribution to the
1LE minimum wage conference volume suggests that focusing on
averages ignores significant heterogeneity among the respondents:
They found using the Survey of Income end Program Participation
that although most people spent relatively short periods of time
working at the minimum wage, a sizeable minority of workers seemed
to be '!trapped" in minimum wage jobs. Theee are the workers whom
one might expect to be most affected by relatively small changes in
the minimum.
The remainder of the table describes characteristics of
respondents which have been shown to affect employment and turnover
rates, and that we control for in our estimation procedures. The
numbers reflect the fact that the NLSY over—sampled poor
respondents, African—Americans, and Hispanics.
Estimation and Reeulte
Table 2 shows our estimates of the effect of the minimum wagechanges on the probability that individuals employed prior to the
change were employed as of the next interview date. In addition to
the variables shown in Table 1, we control for possible business
cycle effects and for the aging of the sample by including year
dummies.
Columns I to 3 show Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimates of
equations of the form
-sWagegap1 + +
whereE'=l if the individual, who was employed in year t—l, was
employed in year t. and =0 otherwise. These are linear probability
models. The results are robust to various changes in the
definition of the sample, with the coefficient on Wagegap ranging
from --0.212 to -0.193. These changes include assuming that those
missing employment data a year later were in fact unemployed
(column 2), and restricting the sample to those who have at least
4 observations with wage data in the base year and non—missing
employment data a year later (column 3). Multiplying the
coefficient on the wage gap by the average wage gap of affected
persons from Table 1 indicates that the probability of employment
for these individuals was reduced by 3 or 4%.
By effectively comparing workers likely to be bound by each
increase in the minimum wage with those who are not bound, the OLS
estimates control for possible changes in labor market conditions
that could affect all workers and that could coincide with
increases in the minimum wage. However, the OLS estimates do not
7take account of the possibility that bound and not bound workers
differ from each other in systematic but unobserved ways. In
particular, low-wage workers may be more likely to separate from
their jobs for the same reasons that they earn low wages, rather
than because they are bound by the minimum wage.
This issue can be addressed by exploiting the panel nature of
the date, estimating an equation of the form
—aWagegap1+X1Ji+p1+ (2)
where represents constant, individual-specific sources of
heterogeneity. We estimate this model using only individuals with
4 or more observations to ensure that there are enough observations
per person to be able to distinguish the individual-specific
component statistically. With this exclusion, and using the years
up to 1987, the sample averages 7 annual observations per
individual. Column 4 shows fixed effects (FE) estimates of the
linear probability model given in (2). The coefficient on Wagegap
(-0.184) is similar to the OLS estimate.
An important limitation of the FE estimates are that the
important elements of individual heterogeneity are assumed to be
constant over time. In particular, it is asmumed that the
characteristics of an individual which make her likely both to be
observed in a low-wage job and to leave that job, remain in force
in subsequent years. Alternatively, individual but transient
circumstances may be responsible for the fact that someone takes a
low—wage job and then, say, leaves in pursuit of betteropportunities.In this case, (2)maynot adequately control for
spurious correlations between the wage gap and the employment
history.
An alternative treatment of unobserved heterogeneity is random
effects estimation.3 The random effects estimator has the
advantage that it utilizes the "between" individual variation in
the data, which the fixed effects estimator ignores, while allowing
for correlation between observations of the same individual over
time.The disadvantage of a random effects model is that the
estimates are inconsistent if the unobserved random variable u is
correlated with the observed explanatory variables included in the
model, which is likely in our case. In any event, the random
effects estimate of the coefficient on Wagegap in the linear
probability model, shown in column S of Table 2, is —0.190 which is
very similar to the fixed effects and simple OLS estimates
discussed above.
Since the dependent variable in this regression is binary, we
would like to estimate a probit or loqit modal. In such models,
however, fixed effects estimstors are inconsistent when the number
of observations per person is small (Heckman, 1981), and the
computational burden is large. An alternative conditional logit
model (c.f. Chamberlain, 1982) ignores individuals who do not
change employment status at least once over the sample period.
This restriction results in a drastic reduction in sample size: All
workers who were continuously employed throughout the sample period
or who were never employed in two consecutive years (sore than two—
9thirds of the sample} are deleted from the sample. It is perhaps
unsurprising that when this "controlu' group is deleted, the
coefficients on the variables of interest (not shown) become
statistically insignificant.Hence, we confirmed the results
discussed above using a random effects probit model (not shown)
Unlike the fixed effects model, random effects estimation of a
probit model is consistent if the random effects orthogonality
assumptions are met.
Because of questions about the reliability of the wage data,
we also estimated the employment models using a variable equal to
one if the person was bound by the minimum wage increase and zero
otherwise instead of the wage gsp. We felt that this dichotomous
variable might be "cleaner", but this change in specification did
not affect our results.
The question of whether the wages of those who remained
employed were affected by changes in the minimum wage is addressed
in Panel A of Table 3. The first three columns show the results of
regressing the change in the log(wage) on Wagegap and the other
control variables, although only the coefficient on Wagegap is
shown. We do not find any significant effect of the wage gap in
the OLS, fixed effect, or random effect models. A less restrictive
specification is estimated in columns 4 to 6.Here, the log(vage)
is regressed on its one—year lag ss well as on the wage gap end
other variables. The two specifications are equivalent only if the
coefficient on the legged variable is 1, which does not seem to be
the case. The results in columns 3 to 6, show that the wage gap is
10estimated to have a negative effect on the wages of those that
remain employed.
Panel B shows that this counter—intuitive result becomes
statistically insignificant if observations with year—to—year wags
changes greater than 100% are excluded. We also find that the
more restrictive specification in which the change in the log (wage)
is regresaed on the wage gap yields a significantly positive
coefficient on Wage gap in this sample.
These results must be interpreted with caution since, as
stated above, we believe that the wage data are subject to more
measurement error than the employment data, and the results are not
robust to changes in the definition of the sample or to changes in
the specification of the estimating equation.
Comelusion
We find that employed individuals who were affected by the new
federal minimums in 1979 and 1980 were 3 to 4% less likely to be
employed a year later, even after accounting for the fact that
worksrs employed at the minimum wage may differ from their peers in
unobservable ways. These results ware obtained using a methodology
similar in spirit to Card's (l992a), but with individual panel
data, which allows us to better control for coincident events which
may confound ths effects of the minisum wage and for worker
haterogeneity. The saaple, however, is from an earlier era, nore
like that studied by Nsumark and Wascher (1992) Data limitations
prevent us from applying our methndoloqy to the period studied by
11Card. Thus we cannot claim to have settled the methodological
debate. Whether our results hold for more recent years remains to
be seen.
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13NOTES
fl These questions are similar to those found in the Current
Population survey.
2. The original 12,686 respondents included 128O people enlisted
in the armed forces. After 1984, all but 201 of these respondents
were dropped from the sample leaving 11,607 people.
3. See Hsiao (1986) for a diacusaion of random effects models.
14Tabis 1; Means of Key Variables
Ease year fl 1979 1980 .1212
Observations with wage 62397 3805 4859 7875
data in base year
*Missingemployment 2341 162 86 281
in next year
I employed in next year .93 .79 .78 .97
excluding missing
I employed ifmissing .89 .75 .77 .93
set to zero
change in the minimum .20 .25 .00
base year to next
-
%boundby change minimum .03 .22 .21 .00
Avg. "wage gap" ifbound .17 .15 .18
(.07) (.05) (.08)
AVg. Wage base year 5.63 3.61 4.13 7.59
(3.34) (1.79) (2.13) (4.46)
Avg. change wage base .64 .70 .69 .82
year to next (2.90) (2.04) (2.31) (3.81)
Avg. I change in wage .24 .30 .27 .23
base year to next (.86) (.73) (.70) (.84)
% Poverty sample .25 .20 .22 .27
I African—American .22 .18 .19 .24
I Hispanic .16 .15 .16 .16
% Male .53 .53 .53 .52
Avg. age in 79 17.92 18.87 18.47 17.62
(2.25) (1.72) (2.03) (2.27)
% High school grad. in 79 .39 .53 .46 .34
*ofindependent ida 11607




















































1.012 .948 . . . .791
(.012) (.010) (.010)
—.195 —.193 —.184 —. 190
(.043) (.034) (.032) (.033)












—.181 —.169 —.162 —.167
(.006) (.005) (.004) (.005)
—.165 —.169 —.178 —.172
(.006) (.004) (.004) (.004)
.025 .010 —.009 .005
(.005) (.004) (.004) (.004)
—.023 —.028 —.024 —.026
(.005) (.004) (.003) (.004)
—.020 —.015 —.018 —.016
(.005) (.004) (.003) (.004)
—.068 .000 —.004 —.001
(.005) (.004) (.003) (.004)
—.007 .002 .003 .002
(.005) (.004) (.003) (.004)
—. 010 —.003 —.001 —.002
(.005) (.004) (.003) (.004)
.046 .074 .077 .075
64705 57508 57508 57508
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.Table 3: Effect of a Change in the Minimum wage on Log(Wage)
Persons with >=4observations only
Panel A: No additional exclusions
Dependent Variable:Change in log(waql Level of log(wage)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS FE RE OLS FE RE
Laglog(wage) — — — .542 .129 .644
(-004)(.005)(.004)
Wage gap .037 .034 .040 —.251—.173 —.249
(.077)(.089)(.073)(.069)(.067)(.069)
B—squared .005 .059 .006 .466 .640 .540
Observations 49864 498644986449864 4986449864
Panel B: Excluding observations with wage changes >100%
Dependent Variable;Change in Level ofjog(wage}
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS FE RE OLS FE RE
Lag log(wage) — — — .734 .383 .802
(.004) (.005)(.004)
Wage gap .199 .213 .201 —.027—.050—.001
(.063) (.069) (.061)(.060) (.060)(.060)
B—squared .006 .163 .007 .594 .719 .652
ftObservations 46969 46969 46969469694696946969
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.
Variables included but not shown: Intercept, Age in 1979, Male,
African-American, Hispanic, Year effects